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s.1. Introduction
In recent years, the Swiss dairy industry has been dramatical
reconﬁgured, in terms of governance and organisation. The prima
reason for this has been progressive deregulation since the 1986-9
GATT Uruguay rounds. These changes can be considered as part of
broader transformation of agri-food systems, often describ
neoliberalisation (e.g. Wolf and Bonnano, 2014). A few decades ag
the Federal state administrated prices, quantities and trade of mil
Now, there are few barriers left between dairy farmers and a fre
globalised market. The last signiﬁcant step in this deregulatio
process has been the removal of the national milk quotas system
which was regulating the quantities of milk that each individu
dairy was allowed to sell on the markets every year. Created in 197
by the Federal ofﬁce for agriculture (FOAG), the quota system acte
as a buffer between farmers and the markets and helped 
maintain comparatively high milk prices by controlling the level . Forney), isabel.haeberli@bfh.chsupply. This system was criticized, however, for its rigidity and th
constraints it placed on farmers. Initial amendments allowed th
trade and exchange of quotas among farmers. Subsequently, th
Federal state then decided that managing markets was no long
within its remit. In 2009, after a few years of transition, the nation
milk quotas were abandoned. This move was inspired by the ide
that markets and economic actors alone should decide how muc
milk should be produced and marketed. The initial result was th
quantities increased and prices fell. However, this deregulation
themilk market deeply changed the relations between the actors
the industry and particularly the power balance between dai
companies and farmers at a collective level.
In this paper we look at how this major change in the gove
nance of the Swiss dairy industry impacted the ways in which dai
farmers co-operate.1 Farmers' organisations had to undertake ne
roles and responsibilities and adapt their action and structure1 The relation between agricultural policy models and the evolution of agricul-
tural co-operatives in diverse national contexts has already been studied and 
described, above all from the point of view of co-operative management and eco-
nomics (e.g. van Bekkum, 2001, which analyses comparatively EU and Australia/
New Zealand case studies).
2 In the case of quantity restrictions in the cheese industry, decided by inter-
professional boards with the aim of maintaining high prices in a context of
decreasing demand, cheese milk surpluses are however sold to industrial dairy
companies.
3 Authors' own estimation based on the ﬁgures published by the Swiss Milk 
4 According to the OECD, the Producer Support Estimate for Switzerland is 62.4%
Producers (SMP, 2016).
   of the gross farm receipts and 18.9% for the EU. Cf. http:/
www.oecd.org/tad/agricultural-policies/
producerandconsumersupportestimatesdatabase.htm, con-sulted 07.09.2016.
2Historically, co-operative structures were dominant amongst dairy
farmers' organisations in Switzerland. Today, however, dairy
farmers are looking for new solutions in a deregulated context,
regrouping and combining efforts in different ways. This has
resulted in multiple kinds of co-operatives coexisting with corpo-
rate forms of farmers’ organisations.
The co-operative movement has often been described by 
referring to the values it mobilises (e.g. ICA, 2014), and its speciﬁc 
way of organising economic relationships (e.g Dunn, 1988). These 
values were often presented as a speciﬁc strength of co-operatives. 
However, they are now criticized by many actors of the Swiss dairy 
industry as a burdensome inheritance that is allegedly not adapted 
anymore to the new economic and political context. In some of our 
interviews, voices call for other forms of organisation, private and 
liberal, that are supposed to be more dynamic and reactive and 
easier to manage in a context of market liberalisation, while others 
long for a co-operative rejuvenation.
In this paper, we look more closely at the relations between 
traditional co-operative values and the changes happening to the 
structures and strategies of farmers' organisations. We compare 
ﬁve dairy farmers' organisations, focusing on their different stra-
tegies and references to the values of democracy, solidarity, and 
autonomy. We explore how these traditional ‘co-operative values’ 
are used as narratives and, at the same time, how these values 
reﬂect in the actual strategies and their consequences for farmers. 
This will lead us to explore the usefulness and pertinence of op-
positions between co-operative and corporate forms of organisa-
tion that are often implicitly framing the literature on co-
operatives, for example by referring to ‘two worlds’ (Bijman et al., 
2013). Moreover, we aim to show the complexity of the relations 
between so called ‘co-operative values’, co-operatives and non-co-
operative structures and actual co-operation.
In terms of structure, the paper is set out as follows: Section 2 
will provide further details on the Swiss context and introduce 
the case studies; Section 3 outlines the methodology; Section 4 
positions the paper in the current literature on co-operation, 
stepping away from interpretations in terms of hybridity and sug-
gesting to look at the three values of democracy, solidarity and 
autonomy, as a mean to describe the diversity of farmers' organi-
sations; Sections 5 presents the adaptive strategies developed by 
dairy farmers’ organisation in Switzerland; and Section 6 discuss 
how these strategies enact co-operatives values in our case studies, 
beyond the classical categorisation between co-operatives and 
other forms of businesses.
2. Context: Swiss agriculture and farmers’ co-operation
2.1. Swiss agriculture, the dairy sector and consequences of
deregulation
Swiss agriculture is diverse and farm structures vary signiﬁ-
cantly according to production and between mountain and low 
land areas. The average farm size was around 20 ha in 2016 (FOAG, 
2016). Swiss agriculture has been highly subsidised for many de-
cades and continues to be so (e.g. OECD, 2016). However, currently, 
the focus of state support has moved away from market control to 
concentrate on other aspects, globally summarized as multi-
functionality (Potter and Tilzey, 2007; Wilson, 2007). This means 
farmers receive direct payments from the government for 
providing diverse services for the common good (related to envi-
ronmental and landscape care, and decentralised population set-
tlement), but this is de-coupled from food production. At the same 
time, the price of agricultural products goes down on deregulated 
markets. Consequently, state support is central in the economic 
balance of all farm businesses, and even more in less favouredareas, like mountain regions.
The dairy sector is an important part of Swiss agriculture, with 
about 23 300 dairy farms amongst a total of 53 232 farms in the 
year 2015 (FOAG, 2016). It is divided into two sub-sectors: the ‘in-
dustrial milk’ chain and the specialist ‘cheese milk’ chain. A single 
farm is integrated into one of these two chains and this will reﬂect 
in the farm organisation, notably on the use of silage to feed the 
cows, which is forbidden in the milk production for cheese 
(because of a risk of bacterial contamination). Farms participating 
in both chains are exceptions.2 Cheese production has been his-
torically e and remains e very important. Around 40% of the milk 
production is turned into a large diversity of cheese specialities, in 
many production facilities, some big but many small-scale (SMP, 
2016). This paper focuses mainly on the industrial milk chain. 
Here, farmers supply big processing companies that produce 
mainly dairy products for direct consumption (yogurts, butter, milk 
and pasteurised industrial cheese) and for the food industry (milk 
powder, butter). This milk supply chain is shaped by a handful of 
dairy companies (the four biggest process 44% of the milk).
Dairy farmers producing for the industrial milk market have two 
sales channel options. First they can collaborate with a middle-
man, a milk-trader; these take the form of producers’ co-
operatives, producer-owned companies and private traders. This 
diversity results from diverging trajectories, regional backgrounds 
and historical contexts of creation. Around 70% of the milk circu-
lates in this indirect channel.3 The second option is direct milk 
delivery to a dairy company. This kind of contract is favoured by the 
big dairy companies, but it is also very commonly applied by small-
scale processors. Dairy farmers associated directly to the same 
dairy company regroup in an association in order to facilitate 
negotiation and communication with the dairy company. However, 
the terms of the contracts between the farmer and the company 
remain individual, and the association acts only as a negotiation 
platform. It does not engage concretely in the buying and selling of 
milk, as milk traders (co-operatives or private companies) do in the 
ﬁrst option.
Both sub-sectors, industrial milk and specialist cheese, have 
been hit hard by the progressive deregulation of the markets. 
However, the industrial milk chain suffered a more dramatic 
decrease in the milk price, related to the increase in production 
after the abandonment of the quotas in 2009. Since then, the dairy 
industry has not been able to reach a consensus on an alternative 
for national quantity management. Thus, supply is controlled above 
all by prices and markets. As a result, the price paid to farmers has 
decreased signiﬁcantly, and continues to do so, accelerating farm 
restructuring. This occurred despite the fact that the Swiss milk 
market is still partly protected from external pressures with cus-
toms and subsidies, and that public ﬁnancial support is very high 
(as noted earlier).4
In general, the Swiss dairy sector has been affected by growing 
discordance, competition and lack of trust between the different 
levels of the supply chain, but also amongst the dairy farmers’ or-
ganisations (Forney, 2012).
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32.2. Agricultural co-operatives in Switzerland
With its tradition of common land, the co-operative idea h
long been known and proven in Switzerland (Eichwald and Lu
2011; Purtschert, 2007). A Swiss man, Johann Heinrich Pestaloz
was one of the pioneers of the modern co-operative system, with
Swiss co-operative law enacted in 1874 (Eichwald and Lutz, 201
In the dairy industry local co-operatives became a commo
approach for collective investment in small-scale cheese factorie
Later, as Massy wrote in 1956, all the production, trading an
processing of milk was organised in co-operatives. At that tim
about 4400 local co-operatives existed to purchase the milk, 
process it or sell it (Massy, 1956). At the regional and national lev
they allied in co-operative federations, which became major eco
nomic and political actors. Under the protectionist regime, farmer
federations had directly inﬂuenced the agricultural policy and i
applications, notably in the management of the quota system
working hand in hand with the FOAG. With the change of paradig
and the removal of the quota system, these organisations lost
signiﬁcant part of their power and inﬂuence.
Today, the number of Swiss co-operatives is decreasing, and t
establishment of new co-operatives is very uncommon (Purtsche
2007). During the last decades of the 20th Century, mergers an
concentration of co-operatives occurred, as did transformation in
private companies. In the dairy industry, local co-operatives hav
often been dismantled, or at least have lost their importance an
main functions, notably because of the decrease in farm number
the closure of small-scale processing facilities and of collective mi
collection infrastructures. Larger second-tier co-operative
(regional federations) involved in the milk trading have had to fac
harsh competition in a tense market.
2.3. Case studies
The dairy farmers’ organisations presented in this paper have a
emerged in the context outlined above. Some of them are st
traditional co-operative structures of primary (i.e. members a
farmers: Milchproduzentengenossenschaft Glarus und Umgebun
MPG) or second-tier type (members are local co-operatives: Prola
Miba). Others are private companies, speciﬁcally public limite
companies (PLC; German: Aktiengesellschaft-AG; French: Socie
anonyme-SA) owned by farmers that emerged from an historical co
operative. This happened either as a strategic choice (aaremilc
AG), or by necessity, after the collapse of the previous organisatio
(Nordostmilch AG). The main characteristics of each case a
detailed in Table 1. The logic behind the selection of the case studi
is explained in the following section.
3. Data and methods
The data informing this paper was collected as part of a researc
project looking at the role of farmers' organisations in the tran
formation of the dairy sector in Switzerland after the removal of th
quota system. The research was originally focused on the deve
opment of new ‘local food’ branded produce as a means of addin
value in a difﬁcult market. We adopted an ethnographic approac
integrating a range of data and mixing different methods
described in more detail below. Our approach was also open
reframing and addressing developments which emerged throug
the course of the research. This iterative approach led us to develo
questions about the evolution of farmers' co-operation an
organisational structures which are central to this paper. Speci
ically, it became apparent that the removal of themilk quota syste
had initiated awider debate on the future of farmers' organisation
and the role of co-operative values and practices, which we seekaddress here.
A total of 49 semi-structured interviews and 14 informal in
terviews were conducted withmembers of eight organisations. Th
interviews were conducted in French or Swiss German, accordin
to the interviewee's mother tongue. For all the semi-structure
interviews, a similar interview guide was used, based mainly o
the development of the organisation, its strategies and projects.
the ﬁve case studies, the leaders (farmers and professional man
agers) of the dairy organisations were interviewed. Three cas
studies were analysed in more depth and the views of th
producers-members were also investigated. Additionally, obse
vations (n ¼ 20) were made during ofﬁcial meetings (gener
meetings, regional or board meetings) and public events related
the initiatives (e.g. inaugurations), where informal discussions wit
members and access to internal debates were possible. Suppl
mentary information was gained from various written sources (e.
websites, newsletters, reports, newspapers). The data were code
using NVivo software, focusing namely on the structures of th
organisation, the relations within and between organisations, th
strategies developed and the values mobilised in the discourses.
4. Co-operatives’ values and the diversity of farmers’
organisations
Co-operatives, as any economic institution, are based on na
ratives that express a cultural understanding of their role in th
economy, their objectives etc. Traditionally, co-operatives’ princ
ples and values are said to oppose free-market principles or liber
laissez-faire. This relates to their historical origin as responses
major change in the economy related to industrialisation. Toda
however, a very diverse set of agricultural co-operatives exist
ranging from big multinationals to small-scale initiatives that try
reconnect farmers and consumers at a local level. In this sectionw
engage with this diversity by looking at the values characterizin
co-operatives. First, we look at how twomajor sets of the literatu
position the question of values within co-operative structures. Th
leads us to question the interpretation of co-operatives as hybrid
which has become prominent in many scientiﬁc publications, an
which reinforce the binaries it criticized. We suggest that applyin
a similar approach to the diverse forms of farmers’ organisations b
looking at how values are mobilised and applied leads to a bett
understanding the diversity of engagement within a comple
economy. To do so we introduce three co-operative values that w
discuss more in detail in this paper: democracy, solidarity, an
autonomy.
4.1. The diverse natures of co-operatives
Co-operatives are said to share similar characteristics, which a
summarised by Dunn (1988: 85) as three general principles of us
1. The user-owner principle, 2. The user-control principle, 3. Th
user-beneﬁts principle. Despite these common principles, it
possible to identify two distinct framings of agricultural co
operatives in the literature. The ﬁrst focuses on co-operatives as
strategic response to changes occurring in mainstream agri-foo
systems; whilst the second describes co-operatives as an altern
tive to capitalist modes of agriculture and economy. One key el
ments differentiating these two sets of literature is the way co
operative values are framed and addressed or not.
In the ﬁrst set of literature, which is clearly dominant, agricu
tural co-operatives have primarily been understood as a collectiv
economic venture. As a consequence, focus is above all to th
pragmatic arrangements in the governance of the co-operative
with little attention paid to the values underlying these choices.
transversal topic here is how co-operatives try to improve farmer
Table 1
The ﬁve case studies, showing the diversity of dairy farmers’ organisations in Switzerland (2015).
Name Legal form Members/shareholders Background
Prolait second-tier co-op Local co-ops Created after the collapse of a larger organisation
Miba second-tier co-op Local co-ops Long history as a federation
MPG Co-op Farmers traditional local co-operative
aaremilch AG PLC ‘Farmer Circles’ and dairies Separation from a larger farmers' co-op
Nordostmilch AG PLC Farmers Created after the collapse of a larger organisation
5 It should be underlined that those values apply to a speciﬁc group and its 
members. Even if the group is inclusive (e.g. farmers' co-operatives are generally 
open to all farmers from there area), co-operation produces always a form of 
exclusion. This is true also in the Swiss context, where farmers' co-operatives 
reproduce exclusive processes related to gender (around 95% of the farmers e as 
head of the farm e are male, e.g. see Contzen and Forney, 2017), social origin 
(access to land is very hard if you have no family farm to take over), and class (e.g. 
no inclusion of farm workers).
4positioning and strategies within a market economy, in a more or 
less direct confrontation with private companies. This results in 
tensions between the speciﬁcities of co-operatives (as described by 
Dunn, 1988) and the logics of efﬁciency, expertise, performance 
and economic return; particularly in the context of increasingly 
competitive global markets. As a consequence, many authors 
outline that co-operative structures have transformed into some-
thing closer to corporate forms of business (e.g. Hogeland, 2006). 
Others describe the changing governance structures of co-
operatives in Europe and elsewhere as ‘new co-operative 
models’ (Bijman et al., 2014; Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013; 
Chaddad and Cook, 2004), involving a transformation in members' 
control and ownership, including the introduction of non-members 
in the board of directors (BoD) and as owners. However, co-
operative structures do still exist and they have not all turned into 
corpo-rate enterprises. Therefore, many authors describe 
contemporary co-operatives as hybrids of traditional corporate and 
co-operative structures and principles (Chaddad, 2012; Gray and 
Stevenson, 2008; Mooney, 2004; Spear, 2011).
This approach can be contrasted with the second set of litera-
ture, which describes farmers' co-operatives as part of a wider 
movement that criticises the mainstream capitalist economy. This 
is due to their engagement of different economic logics, relying on 
collective action, sharing, collaboration and other principles that 
are said to produce fairer and more sustainable economic systems 
(see for example Anderson et al., 2016; van der Ploeg, 2008; 
Gibson-Graham, 2006). Whilst these ‘alternate’ enterprises are 
seen to differ substantively in their goals and structures from the 
traditional forms of farmers' co-operatives described above, we 
argue that there is considerable and often underestimated overlap. 
Consequently rather than opposing two ends of a co-operative 
spectrum, we suggest that this two sets of literature in fact illus-
trate diverse enactments of values among co-operative structures. .
Such a framing draws inspiration from GibsoneGraham's critic 
of the ‘capitalist hegemony’ (1996) that aims at deconstructing a 
capitalocentric representation of economy by pointing to the di-
versity of logics that enterprises actually embody. The authors offer 
a theory of a ‘diverse economy’ (2006) based on a differentiation of 
transaction types (market, alternative market and nonmarket), la-
bor (wage, alternative paid, unpaid) and enterprise (capitalist, 
alternative capitalist, noncapitalist). This approach emphasis the 
multiplicity of logics present in the economy in general, and within 
individual enterprises as well. This diversity opposes essentialist 
and binary understanding of ‘the’ economy (i.e. capitalism) as 
opposed to non-economic endeavours (e.g. value-based, alternative 
networks).
This diversity challenges the hybridity perspective. Whilst
talking about co-operatives’ hybridity might be a way of recognis-
ing the limit of the two categories that shape traditional approaches
to co-operatives, there are problems. First, hybridity is often used to
produce an unbalanced, one-way, framing. Indeed, the hybrid-
isation lens is apparently best applied to the entities and actors that
are different from the mainstream, dominant categories. Although
there is a wide literature on the hybridity of co-operatives (i.e., howthey integrate corporate logics), there is signiﬁcantly less work 
done on the hybridity of corporate structures (i.e., how they inte-
grate more-than-economic logics). In the context of farmers’ or-
ganisations and agri-food businesses, we argue that hybridity 
would be more useful if applied to all kinds of businesses, corporate 
or co-operative alike, as a critic of the reality of the categories we 
generally use to understand the economy of agriculture and food. 
Second, the concept of hybridity takes its value from a complex 
relation to boundaries and categories. Without the prior assump-
tion of ﬁxed boundaries, hybridity would be meaningless (Pieterse, 
2001: 226). Because of this relation to boundaries, hybridity can be 
used either to criticise or accept the categories it refers to. We argue 
that most of the work done on the hybridity of co-operatives tends 
to conﬁrm the validity of a fundamentally binary categorisation, 
opposing corporate to co-operative forms of organisations.
In this paper, we argue that looking at the diversity of values in
farmers' organisations can help us to overcome the dichotomy
between co-operative and corporate models. When we try to think
about the evolution of agricultural co-operatives in similar terms, it
becomes more interesting to look more closely at the factors that
inﬂuence the situation of the members in their relation to the
organisation, and how they foster co-operation or note rather than
to focus on the ‘corporate’ corruption/hybridizationof the co-
operative model.
To do so, we focus now on three values largely ascribed to co-
operatives: democracy, solidarity and autonomy.5 These values 
are both narratives and practices. As narratives, they are explicitly 
mobilised in discourses, as exempliﬁed in the general description 
offered by the International Cooperative Alliance, which emphasise 
the role of core co-operatives values: ‘Co-operatives are based on the 
values of self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity and 
solidarity. In the tradition of their founders, co-operative members 
believe in the ethical values of honesty, openness, social responsibility 
and caring for others’ (ICA, 2014).
As practices, they reﬂect in Dunn's three principles (User-owner, 
user-control and user-beneﬁts), and are mentioned in multiple 
literature sources as supporting the main characteristics of a co-
operative (e.g. Birchall and Simmons, 2004; Hill and Doluschitz,
2014).4.2. Democracy
The members' commitment is central in many discussions on 
co-operatives (Birchall and Simmons, 2004; Cechin et al., 2013). At 
the level of governance, it translates generally into member
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5democracy. In its simplest expression, this equals the principle 
‘one member, one vote’, which is often described as central to th
deﬁnition of a direct and egalitarian democracy in co-operativ
(Mooney, 2004; Purtschert, 2007). According to this view, dem
cratic governance is typically characterised by inclusive and equ
participation and representation of different interests in decisi
making procedures (e.g. Cechin et al., 2013). Other interpretatio
of democracy however do exist. They are often related to large sca
co-operatives and include mechanisms of delegation (indirect d
mocracy) or a distribution of votes in proportion to the invest
capital (proportional rights) (Bijman et al., 2014; Chaddad an
Iliopoulos, 2013). Fundamental here is that the democratic prin
ples ensure that the co-operative members keep ultimate contr
over important decisions, namely regarding strategic orientation
or general management practices.
4.3. Solidarity
The value of solidarity can be seen as a moral translation 
several characteristics of co-operatives, such as egalitarian shari
of beneﬁts and shared interests amongst members. Solidarity b
tween members resonates well with the representation of c
operatives as family-like entities, in relation to an agrarian ideo
ogy, as described by Hogeland (2015). Co-operatives might promo
competition on the market, as a ‘competitive yardstick’ (Hogelan
2006), for the beneﬁt of farmers, but they limit competition b
tween their members. Solidarity is located at the junction of ec
nomic interests and a shared identity. For Gray and Stevens
(2008), it is closely related to the constitution of a collective feeli
of belonging. Solidarity is often understood as the subordination
individualistic interest to the beneﬁt of the collective. This bro
deﬁnition is commonly agreed upon, but within this there is
plurality of sub-deﬁnitions, notably amongst members.
As an example, Hellberg-Bahr et al. (2013) identify differe
types of solidarity in their study on German agricultural co
operatives: solidarity as a basic value (relatedness, to vouch fo
each other), solidarity as members' attitudes towards the co
operative (membership serves realisation of solidary action), an
ﬁnancial solidarity (equal price treatment for all members). A co
operative's BoD has to deal not only with the tensions betwee
solidarity and individual interests, but with these diverse in
terpretations of solidarity too.
4.4. Autonomy
Historically, co-operatives emerged against the threat of mo
nopoly and monopsony within markets. One of their roles has bee
to empower farmers and to provide alternative market acces
freeing them from the domination of the big actors of the agri-fo
industry (e.g. Hogeland, 2006). This autonomy within the market
related to a more political form of autonomy, which has to do wit
members' control and capital ownership. This double deﬁnition
recalling Berlin's (1958) two categories of ‘freedom from’ (he
market dominions) and ‘freedom to’ (here, control the organis
tion) e addresses autonomy at the level of the co-operative, in i
collective dimension: a joint autonomy of the members. In th
literature, many authors identify a clear relation between co
operative development and farmers' independence or autonom
Even if understood in contrasted ways, the same importance 
granted to autonomy as both a central value and a fundamen
objective of co-operation. For example, van der Ploeg (2008) co
siders autonomy as the main goal of new peasantries' struggle
against big corporations (and similar actors united in his concept
Empire), and Hogeland (2006, 2015) identiﬁes farmers' indepe
dence as one of the central agrarian values that inspired the Uagrarian co-operative ideology.
However, there is a real tension between multiple dimensions 
autonomy. Autonomy, or independence, is often formulated at th
individual level as well. This is particularly true for farmers whos
valuation of being one's own boss has been described 
Switzerland (Droz and Forney, 2007; Forney, 2012) and oth
contexts (e.g. Emery, 2015; Stock and Forney, 2014). This valuati
of individual independence sometimes impedes collective mob
lisation and collaboration (Emery, 2015; Roessl, 2005). However, 
we will see, alternative conceptualisations of farmers' autonom
allow a better understanding of the relations between individu
and collective autonomy in co-operatives. Stock and Forney
(2014) analysis of farmers' autonomy as a social tool expands t
reach of autonomy as a concept from a narrow deﬁnition as sel
interest based individualistic independence towards a broad
and dynamic conceptualisation, not just as a value to protect an
strive for, but as a way to become what one hopes to be. Th
deﬁnition of autonomy does not oppose individual freedom 
collaborate. On the contrary, it integrates collaboration and co
lective mobilisation as a means to reach one's goal, at the individu
and collective level. The point is developed by Stock et al. (201
and Emery (2015), who oppose a restrictive and individualis
deﬁnition of autonomy and propose the concept of actual auton
omy that includes co-operation to realise collective interests.
5. Contrasted adaptation strategies amongst farmers’
organisations
In this section, we describe the different forms of the adaptatio
and transformation which have taken place in our case studies, 
response to the context outlined in Section 2. Our observations an
analyses show a diversity of adaptation strategies at differen
levels: governance, structures, activities and relations with oth
actors of the industry. Speciﬁcally, we focus on four strategies: 
The creation of private companies under the control of the co
operative; 2. The development of co-operation with private acto
of the dairy industry; 3. The targeting of niche markets; 4. Th
structural separation of economic political functions.
All these strategic adaptations are related, more or less directl
to the application, interpretation and/or transformation of th
three ‘co-operative values’ described above. Sometimes, the peop
we met mentioned these relations explicitly, drawing on the thre
values as narratives. Often however, they just expressed a sense
tension or contradiction, in a more implicit way. We examine ho
the tensions between strategies and values are negotiated by acto
and how values are discussed and reformulated as practices an
arguably, rejuvenated by the actors in the process.
For the sake of clarity and readability, we present these strat
gies using one single example for each one of them. However, thes
strategies are often combined by the farmers’ organisations 
varying ways. Table 2 at the end of this section summarises t
application and combination of strategies for each organisation.
5.1. Dairy co-operatives creating and integrating private companies
According to Bijman et al. (2014), the introduction of a leg
separation between the co-operative and its economic activities i
common innovation in the adaptation of internal governan
structures of co-operatives. The co-operative creates a separate PL
which manages the co-operatives assets and develops econom
activities. This new company remains under the control of the c
operative that owns 100% of the shares. The main goals here are t
reduction of risk and liabilities for the co-operative and mo
freedom and ﬂexibility for the ﬁrm managers (Bijman et al., 201
Swiss  dairy  co-operatives  have  applied  this  strategy  througho
Table 2
Strategies applied by dairy farmers’ organisations in Switzerland (2015).
Name PLC creation Local collaboration Niche markets Splitting of PLC
Prolait X X
Miba X X X
MPG X X X
aaremilch AG X
Nordostmilch AG X X X
6the 20th Century. Among our case studies, the creation of Le Grand 
Pre SA, by the dairy farmers' federation Prolait (Prolait federation 
laitiere) follows this approach. Prolait is a regional second-tier co-
operative of dairy farmers. It is organised as a federation of 168 
local co-operatives. Its main tasks are milk collection and trade, and 
representation of its members' interests, ﬁrst in the negotiations 
with economic partners. Compared to other producers' organisa-
tions that see themselves as ‘economic actors’ only, Prolait engages 
also in more political debates, at the regional level by lobbying for 
projects that would be beneﬁcial for dairy farmers and by partici-
pating in the national debate through its membership in the Swiss 
Milk Producers federation. On the market, Prolait depends largely 
on one customer that buys 80% of its milk. Unsatisﬁed with this 
clear dependency and with the resulting limited autonomy in the 
milk trade, Prolait set a new strategy with the aim of gaining added 
value for milk, strengthening autonomy from big dairy companies, 
and enhancing its members' loyalty and identiﬁcation with the co-
operative (see also Forney and Häberli, 2016). In 2011, Prolait took 
over the production of local cheese specialties in the town of 
Moudon. To do so, the federation founded the PLC Le Grand Pre SA  in 
order to build and run a local cheese factory. At the same time, 
Prolait created a new corresponding brand for dairy products, 
positioning these products as ‘local’.6 At the operational level, the 
new ﬁrm beneﬁts from a large degree of autonomy from the co-
operative. Nevertheless, ownership remains in the co-operative's 
hands, and the milk processed in the company and under the 
company's brand is exclusively delivered by the co-operative.
Prolait refers extensively to the importance of solidarity be-
tween dairy farmers, within the co-operative and at the national
level. The creation of the ﬁrm Le Grand Pre SA is totally integrated
in this narrative: All the members’ invested collectively in this
cheese factory e through the action of the co-operative e and all
the members should beneﬁt equally from the proﬁts that will
result. Indeed, the milk used to produce the cheese represents a
tiny portion of the amount traded by Prolait, but the added-value
gained in this niche-market is then distributed through the stan-
dard milk price for every producer-member. This emphasis on
solidarity is stated clearly by a member of Prolait BoD:
We manage the risk co-operatively, because everyone participates
in the investment fund, but later we also manage the beneﬁts co-
operatively. And the [other] farmer, the one whose milk will
never be processed in this new dairy (…) will still proﬁt from this
additional cent. Like that you can weld together the farmers. (…)
Like that everybody should be interested in the well-functioning of
the project. (…) Because this is very uncommon … Normally you
share the loss but never the beneﬁts.
(BoD member, Prolait)6 We have discussed elsewhere the complexity and ambiguity of the ‘local’ in this 
 kind of food network, see Forney and Häberli, 2016.According to Prolait management staff, farmers’ weak position
in the milk market should be solved by solidarity and collaboration,
by ﬁnding collective solutions. Co-operative members are also
aware of the potential of collaboration:
The farmers will lead this. It is a whole group of farmers and this
has a different weight. A single farmer can do nothing.
(Dairy farmer, Prolait).
However, the development of the PLC within the structures of
the co-operative presents a challenge to the democratic and user-
control principle. The co-operative BoD keeps a clear control of
the ﬁrm business: The co-operative owns the ﬁrm; the co-operative
BoD is represented in the ﬁrm's BoD, and the director is the same
for the two entities. Still, members' participation in decision-
making processes is very indirect, as the ﬁrm is run as a separate
enterprise. Co-operative members are clearly aware of this lack of
control over the afﬁliated PLC. A farmer even described his lack of
insight on the ﬁrm business as ‘a big grievance’ (dairy farmer, Pro-
lait). This situation clearly impacts the transparency of the ﬁrm
activity and accountancy. However, the majority of individual
members we interviewed were not overly worried about this,
probably because of the already existing distance and an already
weak feeling of control by individual farmers over the large second-
tier co-operative. Obviously the complexiﬁcation of the co-
operative structures resulting from the creation of a dependent
company increases this distance, both at the level of objective
control power and the level of subjective sense of control.5.2. Collaboration with local dairy companies
The history of farmers' co-operatives is closely related to col-
lective investments in processing facilities, in Switzerland and 
more generally in western countries (e.g. Hogeland, 2006). One of 
our case studies shows an alternative way of vertical integration, 
including close collaboration between the farmers and a dairy 
company, at a local level. This happened in the mountainous canton 
of Glarus between the MPG, a local co-operative of dairy farmers, 
and Geska AG, a local family company and currently the only 
manufacturer of an ancient cheese specialty called Glarner Schab-
ziger®. Since 2000, MPG began to produce a speciﬁc kind of curd 
(Swiss German: Rohziger) which is the main pre-product of the 
Glarner Schabziger®. In 2009, after lengthy negotiations, MPG and 
Geska AG ﬁnally decided to create together a new PLC that would 
take care of processing MPG milk into good quality curd. The local 
farmers’ co-operative holds 51% of the shares of this new company. 
New production facilities were constructed and integrated into the 
Geska AG building and production started in spring 2013. This joint 
venture of dairy farmers and the cheese manufacturer will ensure 
milk sales, guarantee a good milk price for dairy farmers and secure 
the production of Glarner Schabziger®.
In this speciﬁc case, the joint venture by MPG and Geska AG
includes renewed interdependencies, of course between members
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7of the co-operatives themselves, but also between the publ
limited company and the local farmers. Reciprocal dependency an
shared feeling of responsibility are emphasised in interviews, bot
from the side of the company and the farmers:
This interdependency is bigger now, now we have only one sup
plier. This supplier is represented even in the management stru
ture, we can't let things get messed up, because then we sho
ourselves in the foot [‘drive in our own living room’].
(Member of GESKA managemen
This is certainly not a bad thing. GESKA is obligated as well and
reliant on us.
(Dairy farmer, member MPG
Some farmers interpret this new situation as ambiguous and
a loss of control over the production of curd: Farmers have to sha
this control with their new partner. However, most seem happ
with the new company, Glarner Milch AG. As a result, MPG is no
the only provider for the Glarner Schabziger® production, without
competitor. This situation provides an important protection fro
market ﬂuctuations. Furthermore, farmers gained more collectiv
control on the milk price and the curd production (quantities).
other words, renewed interdependencies, through a collective in
vestment, have a positive impact on the level of farmers’ contr
and autonomy. Obviously, interdependency implies a balance
power relations and the fact that Geska AG is a comparatively sma
company with signiﬁcantly less power than other major players
the industry is no coincidence. This goes along with the special
sation in the production and marketing of a very speciﬁc produc
This marketing strategy partly protects the two partners from th
pressures related to the national and global milk market.e
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re5.3. Targeting niche markets
As we have already seen with the example of Prolait and th
cheese specialities produced under the brand ‘Le Grand Pre’, som
of the farmers' organisations we studied have engaged in th
marketing of dairy products. In itself, this is nothing new,
farmers' co-operatives have tried for a long time to ﬁnd added
value by marketing directly the products of their members. How
ever, one particularity here is that all these new marketing initi
tives target niche markets, by developing a speciﬁc brand. Som
draw on the ‘local food’ trend to position their products as a mean
for ‘reconnecting’ producers and consumers. Others target expo
markets, using a ‘Swiss quality’ image. The actual ways of doin
vary signiﬁcantly, in the relations with processors and retailers, th
markets targeted, and the success met. But for all these marketin
ventures, the milk transiting through these speciﬁc channels rep
resents only a small portion of all the milk traded by th
organisation.
As an example, the MIBA federation (MIBA Milchverband d
Nordwestschweiz) recently resurrected the almost-forgotten MIB
brand that was once well-known in the north-western part
Switzerland. MIBA has a long history as a co-operative dating bac
to 1905. Until recently it was a second-tier co-operative federatin
171 local co-operatives located in the north-western region
Switzerland (German- and French-speaking parts). In 2015, how
ever, it transformed into a primary co-operative structure, wit
dairy farmers becoming direct members. MIBA is active in the mi
trade and sells its members' milk (apart from the ‘cheese-milk’)
six dairy companies in Switzerland. In 2010 the co-operativ
founded a new wholesaling company, MIBA Milchprodukte A
which started to distribute the milk products of varioumanufacturers to commercial customers like restaurants, hospital
rest homes, and retailers. The intention was also to use the com
pany as a launching platform for MIBA's own brand. Since 201
dairy products made from ‘regional’ milk (from MIBA membe
only) have been produced there, partly under the MIBA brand, fo
regional marketing. As MIBA does not possess processing facilitie
this venture includes collaborations with processors. MIBA prod
ucts are now sold by other retailers too.
Despite themarginal nature of these product sales (as part of th
overall business turn-over), there is an explicit objective of gettin
some autonomy from the big dairy companies, beyond the dire
economic added-value. Dairy farmers' organisations struggle
ﬁnd this autonomy in the mainstream ‘industrial milk’ channe
which is dominated by powerful actors. The development of ma
keting strategies is then a means for multiplying and diversifyin
the purchasers and developing alternative markets. According
our interviewees, in these alternative value chains, the dai
farmers' organisation is able to get more control, make decision
and ﬁnally to give price guarantees for the milk delivered by i
farmers. This autonomy is not perfect and is limited to these sp
ciﬁc activities, but the organisation no longer depends 100% o
others (corporate dairy companies), as underlined by a member
MIBA management:
We will never be in a strong position in comparison to them
because they hold the capacity of processing. However, althoug
we can only send small signals and process small amounts [
milk], this is still better than doing nothing and being 100 perce
dependent. Because later, we will have opportunities for oth
projects, for new projects.
(Member of MIBA managemen
Here, the symbolic value of these initiatives is underlined. Bein
autonomous is also to be able to think of new projects and to fe
able to actually do something against the difﬁculties characterisin
the industry. Furthermore, through the development of their ne
strategies, the co-operatives also gained autonomy through th
mastery of new knowledge and skills, notably on the functioning
the milk market and the supply chain. According to our in
terviewees, this is useful in negotiations with other dairy ente
prises and dairy organisations: They are now better informed an
better prepared.5.4. Separation of political and market functions: new public
limited companies
Amongst our case studies, there are a few examples of dai
farmers' organisations that are not legally deﬁned as co-operative
but as PLCs. These organisations are farmer-owned and, accordin
to their BoDs, still follow a clear ‘co-operative philosophy’ or ‘co
operative spirit’. They were created because of structural chang
within farmers' organisations and emerged from a co-operativ
background, but are now fully independent from other co
operatives. They act as milk-trading companies, buying milk fro
the producer-members and selling it to diverse dairy companie
with the objective of getting the highest milk price for the
members. In this sense, these companies are still farmer- an
owner-oriented, but they identify themselves as ‘economic actor
only, in opposition to other organisations that playmore explicitly
political role in the regional and national arenas, e.g. throug
lobbying or communication in the medias.
The move from a co-operative structure to a PLC potential
impacts on essential aspects of co-operatives, ownership an
control rights. According to Chaddad and Cook (2004), those a
8essential factors in the understanding of organisational innovations 
in co-operatives, and they deﬁne a variety of governance models. In 
a later publication, Chaddad and Iliopoulos (2013) assess the 
several models of governance they identiﬁed amongst farmer-
owned businesses and place them on a ‘member control’ contin-
uum, ranging from integration to demutualisation.
The case of aaremilch AG exempliﬁes such move from a ‘tradi-
tional co-operative model’ to another one, closer to a ‘corporate
model’.
Aaremilch AG was founded in the year 2007 by separating the
milk-trading business from the Bernese farmers' co-operative. The
shareholders are so-called ‘milk circles’ (German: Milchringe) as
well as 43 afﬁliated cheese dairies. The milk circles are amalgam-
ations of local dairy co-operatives, associations or groups of dairy
farmers, which are regional structures existing already long before
the company's foundation. The circles are unevenly organised,
depending to regional dynamics. Seventy-ﬁve per cent of the shares
are divided according to milk quantities delivered by the milk cir-
cles. The presidents of the milk circles and sometimes further
delegates represent the milk circles at the shareholders' general
assembly (GA). Members of the BoD are elected by the GA. In other
words, the company is generally organised in a similar way as a
second-tier co-operative, with a signiﬁcant difference in the dis-
tribution of control rights. A traditional Swiss co-operative would
follow the principle of one member-one vote. Here the model is
proportional distribution of control rights. Interestingly, the pro-
portion of votes is related to milk production, and not to capital, in
opposition to other proportional control systems found in some co-
operatives or in the shareholding principle.
In addition, the director of aaremilch AG, a professional manager 
who already held a managing position in the former co-operative 
structure, owns a signiﬁcant 25% of the shares. This equals 25% of 
the voices at the GA and consequently gives him considerable in-
ﬂuence. Apparently this choice has been deliberate and has even 
been requested by the BoD as proof of commitment to the company. 
This de facto allows ownership and control by non-members. This 
integration of non-farmers extends as well to the BoD, even if 
following aaremilch AG's constitution the majority of the BoD 
members have to be farmers. As said, this kind of adaptation has 
been well documented for co-operatives (e.g. Bijman et al., 2013; 
Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013) with conclusions that generally 
highlight the loss of control by members. Indeed, the BoD could 
take most of the decisions alone. However, from the interview data, 
we infer that the milk-trading company has been managed quite 
democratically, so far. A board member of aaremilch AG minimises 
the impact of the legal form on the democratic principle:
In a co-operative it is ﬁrst of all about voice and inﬂuence. And in a
market organisation like we are, other topics are at focus. Although,
sometimes we are somewhat struggling with this balance as the
individual milk producer, logically, wants to have a certain inﬂu-
ence. But we have the feeling that with this mixture we have, we are
a PLC [AG], but we still maintain to some extent the philosophy of a
co-operative. Maintaining certain restrictions in the constitution;
until now it has worked well.
(Member of aaremilch AG management)
This claim of having a ‘co-operative philosophy’ additionally
refers to the values of solidarity and to the cohesion within the
organisation. As an illustration, an essential incentive for the cre-
ation of aaremilch AG has been ﬁnding a solution for all the dairy
farmers in the region, without letting some fall behind without a
purchaser for their milk. According to our interviewees, this spirit
of cohesion produces adhesion and trust amongst the membersfollowing the idea.
Finally, the leaders of these companies develop a strong 
discourse on autonomy as a fundamental objective. They are proud 
to say that the company was created independently, by farmers, 
and is now able to negotiate with big dairy companies. If they 
manage to get bigger and stronger, even to confront them and step 
away from one-sided relations of dependency. In a certain way, this 
narrative echoes Hogeland's (2006) description of a co-operative 
business philosophy (which was already prominent in the US of 
the early 20th Century and supported notably by the Californian 
attorney Aaron Sapiro) which wanted farmers' co-operatives to get 
big and strong enough in an attempt of ‘Out-Cargilling Cargill’.
6. Discussion: beyond corporate and co-operative models, the
enactment of co-operative values
Our case studies show clearly that the ‘hybridity’ is not conﬁned 
to traditional co-operatives and that tensions exist in all organisa-
tion types we met, amongst dairy farmers' organisations. The new 
milk trading PLCs are not less ‘hybrid’, showing characteristics and 
referring to the values of a co-operative whilst having the legal 
form of a private company. Leaders of the PLCs describe their 
organisation to be ‘like a co-operative’, which means having the 
philosophy and ‘positive aspects’ of a co-operative as well as the 
positive characteristic of a ﬂexible market organisation. All our 
interviewees refer explicitly to contrasted and multiple logics and 
values when talking about how they understand their organisation, 
its goals and functions. In doing so, they express at the end very 
similar narratives. However notable nuances appear, above all 
about how the best way to enact these values in the management of 
the organisation. The statement that the organisations draw 
simultaneously on diverse logics and values echoes GibsoneGra-
ham's (2006: 74) conception of enterprises in the diverse economy 
perspective: Any one business will encompass various kinds of 
transactions (market and nonmarket), labour (waged, unpaid) and 
processes of production, appropriation and distribution. This is 
deﬁnitively the case for the farmers' organisations we studied. 
None of them can be really understood in a simple economic 
category, for instance in relation to the structural organisation. All 
of them provide place for negotiation and management of tensions 
between diverse imperatives, values and practices. Being a co-
operative or a PLC per se, in this sense, has arguably less impor-
tance than what is often assumed. At least, our results show that 
the speciﬁcity of co-operatives is not to be found in a so-called 
‘hybridity’ and in the tensions between antagonistic logics.
We want now to come back to the three ‘co-operative’ values
that we use in our description and understanding of strategies and
adaptation developed by the Swiss dairy farmers' organisations,
through and beyond the narratives on values. What can we say if
we try to identify general challenges or evolutions in the deﬁnition
of ‘co-operative’ values? How do our case studies help us to have a
better understanding of what these values actually mean in the
current Swiss context? How can we understand the impact of the
recent deregulation on the co-operative spirit in the Swiss dairy
industry?
6.1. Competitiveness, democratic participation and trust
In all our case studies, tensions exist between democratic 
principles and the economic functioning of the organisation. This is 
no real surprise as similar problems have been often identiﬁed in 
the literature (e.g. Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013; Mooney, 2004; 
Nilsson et al., 2012; Pozzobon and Zylbersztajn, 2013).
For the managers of the organisations we studied, democracy's
only problems are its rigidity and slowness, that produce
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9inefﬁciency on a market were ﬂexibility and fast decision are see
as crucial, above all for comparatively large structures. For exampl
one member of MIBA's BoD commented negatively the possibili
of giving more decision-making power to the members (i.e
delegates):
I like discussions and democracy, but, like this, it will be difﬁcult
decide. […] It would be a lot of effort to keep the delegates we
informed. We would need at least three delegates' assemblies p
year. Costs of administration and manpower requirements wou
rise.
One of his colleagues puts it more radically, saying that the co
operative systemmight be good, but could also be ‘fatal’ by slowin
the organisation strategies and therefore ruining its competitiv
ness. At the same time, in the interviews, MIBA farmers complaine
about the difﬁculty as an individual member of inﬂuencing th
organisation's strategy, constitution or politics. At this time, the
referred to the complexity of members' actions due to the feder
tive structures.7
We mentioned the issue of the growing distance and loss
control between individual members and governing instances
relation to the foundation of private ﬁrms by the co-operative
Here the distance is not related to growth, but to structural ba
riers and complexity of the organisation. However, as said, most
the members we interviewed did not point to this situation as
problem. Rather, they emphasised positive aspects. The develop
ment of the ﬁrm and of the cheese production, was presented as
sign that the BoD was actually doing something to improve th
members' situation. In these cases, the loss of democratic contr
was compensated by other aspects and, potentially improved th
trust that members have in the organisation. This echoes in som
ways the requirement by aaremilch's BoD that their director pa
ticipates in the shares at a high level (25%). What is objectively
loss in the control power of the producers-members is presented
a proof of commitment for the common interest.
6.2. Identiﬁcation and solidarity
Members' adhesion and identiﬁcation to the organisation, 
well as trust are important for the success of co-operatives and c
operative-like organisations success. As Nilsson et al. (2012) fram
it, these elements form the organisation's social capital, which is
co-operative advantage of this kind of businesses over the
corporate competitors. It seems that the BoDs of the organisation
we studied are aware of the threat of losing members' identiﬁcatio
and of the importance of maintaining identiﬁcation and trust. On
of the reasons is that in the new competitive context, there is th
risk of losing members who would be attracted by another org
nisation, hoping, for example, for higher prices. To be competitiv
the organisations have to offer the highest prices, or to give oth
reasons for members' adhesion, in other words, to develop its soci
capital. This has become at the same time necessary and mo
complex with the process of co-operatives’ mergers and growth. 
large co-operatives, the heterogeneity within the members h
grown at the economic, geographical, social and cultural levels, ane
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7 Shortly after the end of the research, MIBA simpliﬁed its structures, by changing
from a second-tier to a primary co-operative. In addition, MIBA and Nordostmilch
merged their milk trading activities and created the ‘Mooh’ co-operative. This new
organisation has around 3000 members (dairy farmers) spread over a large portion
of the national territory (in the North, in 17 different cantons). Nordostmilch has
been dissolved, but MIBA still exists, in relation to other activities. We did not
integrate this new development in the paper as it happened after the end of the
research project.consequently feelings of belonging and sameness have decreased
In our case studies, members’ commitment seems to be close
related to the value of solidarity and its varying interpretations. Th
managers and directors of the organisations have to prove they a
ﬁghting for all their members equally and in turn, themembers w
be committed to their organisation and will trust each other. Th
reﬂects in the plural form used by a Nordostmilch AG produce
member whilst saying: “WE support them because they are doin
something for US.”
Nilsson et al. (2012) identify a trade-off between ﬁnancial ca
ital needed for investment and an organisation's stock of soci
capital in the context of strategy of integration. Extending th
interpretation, we can point to another trade-off at the level of th
members, where they have to weight individual and collective in
terest one against the other. The belief in the empowermen
resulting from collective action seems to be still very stron
amongst both members and managers of the organisations w
studied. However, this does not imply an automatic feeling 
belonging amongst the members, who express uneasiness in the
relation with their organisations.
Interestingly, a professional manager of MIBA, acknowledgin
ﬁrst a crisis in the identiﬁcation of members to the large co
operative, made a direct connection between the strategic
choice of re-creating the MIBA brand, and the objective of rejuv
nating identiﬁcation of members. According to him, identiﬁcatio
is ﬁrst promoted by the dynamic of the project itself: Membe
arguably will see that the co-operative is developing an interestin
project and will feel as a part of this process. Second, he emphasise
the symbolic aspect of the products, which serve as banners an
emblems. As he says, ‘without a product, you cannot create iden
tiﬁcation’. Finally, he mentions the virtuous circle that might resu
between the economic aspect of the project and identiﬁcation:
your product sells well, you have more cohesion betwee
members’.
6.3. Actual autonomy requires some kind of democracy and
solidarity
One central and common goal of all these strategies is 
strengthen dairy farmers' position, notably by enabling great
autonomy. In a context of strong deregulation, autonomy is close
related to the economic strength on the market and economic in
dependence of dairy companies. The farmers’ organisations lon
for more control over milk products and milk prices. With the
different projects, they have all made some progress in this dire
tion, gaining autonomy by means of collective action and chose
interdependencies. Their strategies, even if diverging and con
trasting, illustrate in a similar way that solutions are found in
collective struggle for autonomisation, in spite of an increasin
deregulation encouraging individualist competition. This resonate
strongly with the notion of actual autonomy and independence, 
developed by Stock et al. (2014) and Emery (2015), in oppositi
to individualist values. These authors suggest that actu
indepen-dence or autonomy do not oppose to interdependenc
but to dependency, which results often from unbalanc
economic relations.
In our interviews, we found the same tensions between th
farmers' individual freedomein economic and strategic choices
and collective interdependencies to escape from dependencie
resulting from unbalanced relations of power in the market. In
classical sense of co-operation, interdependencies based on sol
darity between farmers are expected to produce collective auton
omy. Interestingly our interviewees expand the link betwee
autonomy and solidarity to other partners (non-farmers), as th
example of the collaboration between the MPG and Geska AG h
10shown. As another example, leaders of Nordostmilch AG, make
clear the distinction between what they call ‘positive dependency’
(or interdependency) and ‘negative dependency’. Mutual de-
pendency between the farmers' organisation and its dairy industry
partners is described as positive, as long as the partners are equals
and as long as it is a winewin situation. Negative dependency is
one-sided and might be from the state or from big dairy enter-
prises. By emphasising this, they underline the difference between
interdependency and dependency, which lays in the balance of
power between the partners.
We argue that the importance given to mutual or shared in-
terests (this ‘winewin situation’) and to equality in the relations
between the partners are speciﬁc reﬂections of the central values of
solidarity and democracy. Indeed, the pursuit of actual autonomy
binds the other values together; or in other words, autonomy,
solidarity and democracy are inevitably entangled. The way one of
these values is effectively enacted in the organisation's strategies
and decisions has a strong impact on the two others. Democratic
control of an organisation is meant to guarantee that its members'
interests are well defended. When an organisation demonstrates
that it works hard for the collective autonomisation of its members,
this creates trust and commitment. This identiﬁcation of the
members to the organisation reinforces solidarity amongst mem-
bers and partners. The complex relations between the three ‘values’
can be articulated in many ways, beyond those outlined here. What
seems important is that the three of them appear to be central in
any kind of co-operation described above, mainly because they are
so fundamentally interrelated.
7. Conclusion
The evolution and transformation of agricultural co-operatives 
is generally described in a pessimistic way, by underlining a trend 
of ‘corporatisation’. Whilst adaptations might strengthen economic 
viability, they are seen to carry a risk of undermining the speciﬁc-
ities of co-operative organisations (e.g. Bijman et al., 2014; Chaddad 
and Iliopoulos, 2013; Nilsson et al., 2012). In the current context of 
Swiss dairy farming, this trend has been reinforced by recent 
deregulation. However, the pressures resulting from deregulation 
have, in some ways, re-actualised co-operative values, and inspired 
strategies to maintain and reassert these in recent transformations. 
The existing literature often presents co-operatives as being 
fundamentally different from other kind of businesses, especially 
corporate ones, due to the values they embody. Consequently, co-
operative and corporate models are seen as antagonistic. We argue 
that such a dichotomy does not allow to fully grasp the complexity 
of the relation between the co-operatives and corporate businesses, 
particularly so now in light of recent transformations.
Applying this interpretation to the speciﬁc context of our
research helps us to partly mitigate the pessimistic narrative of
agricultural co-operative decline in three ways. The deregulation of
the Swiss milk market did not exclusively promote more compet-
itive andmarket oriented strategies or values in themanagement of
the existing dairy farmers’ co-operatives. Whilst we found in-
dications of a weakening of some co-operative characteristics, at
the same time we found signs of a rejuvenation of co-operative
values. There is no unique trend here, but an ambiguous evolu-
tion that both strengthens co-operative values and weakens the
structures that traditionally enacted them.
However, our analysis of the strategies developed by Swiss dairy
farmers' organisations show, that democracy, solidarity and au-
tonomy are deeply rooted in farmers' practices and narratives of co-
operation. The correlation between co-operation as a practice and
these three ‘values’ as narratives produces complex and unex-
pected outcomes in the way farmers' organisations enact co-operation in a context of change and market deregulation. Conse-
quently, we suggest that looking at democracy, solidarity and au-
tonomy only as explicit ‘values’ might be misleading. Doing so, we
might overlook the complex relations that unit narratives and
practices. As our case studies show, the practice of co-operation
impacts the enactment of the three principles of democracy, soli-
darity and autonomy. There is, we think, still a lot to learn about the
interconnections between doing and talking about co-operation
between farmers and more generally within agri-food systems.
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